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ABSTRACT
Between 2001 and 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration determined 40.2
percent of fatal general aviation accidents in the United States, or 1,259 accidents, were
caused by inflight loss of control. General aviation accidents continue to be responsible
for more than 440 fatalities each year in the United States, and approximately 40 percent
of these are caused by loss of control, mainly stalls. This sequential mixed methods
study tested the theory that the number of stalls in the traffic pattern in light general
aviation aircraft can be reduced when aircraft are equipped with supplemental angle of
attack instrumentation designed to provide the pilot continuous situational awareness
regarding remaining lift available for the current aircraft configuration and flight
conditions. Quantitative research questions first addressed the relationship between
stabilized approaches and installation of supplemental AOA systems through multiple
regressions. Safety surveys of flight instructors and students were then used to probe
significant findings regarding AOA system contributions to flying stabilized approaches.
These follow up surveys were designed to better understand the quantitative results as
well as collect information useful to developing future training. Over the course of 1,616
analyzed approaches flown between October 1, 2013 and December 31, 2014, the
addition of supplemental angle of attack systems alone did not significantly increase the
likelihood of subject pilots flying a stabilized approach. The overall regression models
for airspeed and altitude elements of stabilized approaches were significant, but no
significant effect of supplemental AOA systems was observed. Likewise, checking each
x

individual AOA system for influence on approach performance against the control group
of unmodified aircraft yielded no significant effects. Technical limitations of flight data
collection equipment and lack of formal training for subject pilots were identified as
possible masks of AOA system effects. Recommendations for formal training and future
research are made based on these limitations.

xi

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Between 2001 and 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) determined
40.2 percent of fatal general aviation accidents in the United States, or 1,259 accidents,
were caused by inflight loss of control (FAA GAJSC, 2012). Of all these fatal accidents,
the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association’s (AOPA) Air Safety Institute claims stalls
and spins during the base to final turn accounted for seven percent while other loss of
control while maneuvering made up another 13 percent (Hirschman, 2011). General
aviation accidents continue to be responsible for more than 440 fatalities each year in the
United States, and approximately 40 percent of these are caused by loss of control,
mainly stalls (FAA InFO, 2014).
An aircraft’s angle of attack, or AOA, is defined as the angle between the wing’s
chord line and the relative wind (Figure 1). The chord is a line drawn between the wing’s
leading edge and its trailing edge. The relative wind refers to the direction at which a
vehicle in flight meets the oncoming airstream. While many texts display the relative
wind horizontally, and perhaps contribute to common confusion between pitch angle (the
angle between the aircraft’s longitudinal axis and the Earth’s surface) and AOA, the
relative wind is not necessarily parallel to the Earth’s surface, particularly when the
aircraft is not in level flight. Relative wind is also known as freestream velocity, or the
velocity of the airflow far enough in front of the aircraft that it is not affected by the
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aircraft passing through it (Scott, 2004). A complete list of aviation terms used in this
study is included at Appendix A.

Level Flight

Climb

Descent
Figure 1. AOA in level flight, climb, and descent (Scott, 2004)
The lift produced by the wing increases as AOA increases until airflow traveling
over the wing’s upper surface begins to separate. Once this separation occurs, lift is
drastically reduced. Critical AOA (Figure 2) is that AOA at which the wing’s maximum
lift is achieved, beyond which there is a significant loss of lift and increase in drag, where
the wing “stalls” (FAA, 2008 and McCormick, 1979).
Regardless of airspeed, the wing always stalls at the same AOA independent of
aircraft attitude. For airfoils used in light general aviation aircraft wings (often NACA
2412 airfoils), the critical AOA is typically approximately 15 degrees. The actual stalling
airspeed varies, and depends on such factors as weight, loading, acceleration, and bank
angle. AOA systems make it simpler for pilots to maintain situational awareness during
2

critical or high-workload phases of flight. AOPA’s manager of regulatory affairs, David
Oord, claims AOA systems will help general aviation pilots maintain control “regardless
of weight, airspeed, bank angle, density altitude, configuration, or center of gravity”
(Namowitz, 2014, p. 1).

Figure 2. Relationship between lift and angle of attack
Nevertheless, few light general aviation airplanes are equipped with real time
AOA instrumentation. Unless they have flown more advanced aircraft, general aviation
pilots’ knowledge of AOA concepts remains limited to what was learned in ground
school, and may not easily translate to everyday flying. Light general aviation aircraft
pilots rely on indicated airspeed and/or control “feel” and are left to guess exactly when
the airplane will stall based on a known stall speed for an unaccelerated straight flight
condition, inflight experience gained while learning stall recoveries, and academic
discussions of aerodynamic theory they might have had during ground training.
Installing instrumentation to continuously display AOA regardless of weight, air density,
aircraft attitude, turbulence, ground effect, or flap/landing gear configuration increases
the pilot’s awareness of lift available prior to stall (Hirschman, 2011). Theoretically,
supplemental AOA instrumentation should reduce the number of loss of control accidents
by more clearly alerting the pilot prior to stalling the aircraft.
3

In response to concern about overall general aviation safety, the FAA created its
General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) during the mid-1990s to parallel the
existing Commercial Aviation Safety Team. After becoming inactive for several years, it
was reestablished in 2011. FAA and industry representatives agreed to pursue a one
percent annual reduction in the general aviation fatal accident rate based on the period
2006-2008, arriving at a rate no greater than one fatal accident per 100,000 flying hours
by 2018. The committee’s Loss of Control Work Group studied accident subsets of
experimental amateur-built airplanes, certified piston engine airplanes, and turbine engine
powered airplanes in an attempt to identify focus areas for new safety initiatives. The
group examined 279 approach and landing accidents recorded between 2001 and 2010,
and randomly selected 60 representing each subset. They then examined the first 30 well
documented accidents from each list in detail. Subject matter experts provided the group
briefings about AOA indicators, electronic recovery control systems, upset recovery
training, and prescription and over-the-counter drugs used by pilots. The Loss of Control
Work Group approved 23 individual safety enhancement projects in 2012. The top two
priority projects focus on AOA systems for new and current production aircraft, and for
the existing general aviation fleet (FAA GAJSC, 2012). Kevin Clover, National FAA
Safety Team operations lead, explained the overall goal of the work group’s suggested
enhancements: “Outcomes for these strategies will likely evolve into aviation technology
changes and/or enhancements. Other strategies will focus on enhanced training and
educational outreach and will involve a greater working relationship with the FAA Safety
Team” (Hoffmann, 2012, p. 29). Current FAA training in AOA awareness is found in
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Advisory Circular AC120-109, “Stall and Stick Pusher Training,” but expanded training
literature for general aviation applications will be needed (Namowitz, 2012).
Although there has been limited interest in AOA instrumentation for general
aviation aircraft for the last 30 years, little research has been done to investigate any
measurable safety enhancement realized by its use. Fred Scott, a pilot who lost friends in
a stall/spin accident, and Tom Rosen, American Bonanza Society director, have funded
initial testing of AOA instrumentation manufactured by Alpha Systems, a Minnesota firm
which began developing and selling AOA equipment for general aviation in the 1980s
(Hirschman, 2011). Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University recently installed AOA
indicators on its entire fleet of 61 Cessna training aircraft at its Daytona Beach and
Prescott campuses. In an unpublished demonstration, the university conducted 30 trial
flights prior to installation to qualitatively determine which AOA display would be most
effective and gather flight instructor feedback on which maneuvers would be most
improved for student pilots. Initial findings indicated student knowledge of aircraft
performance improved, particularly at slower airspeeds. Future research will be aimed at
identifying best practices and learning methodologies for integrating AOA technology
into flight education (Van Buren, 2013).
Purdue University is currently the lead organization for a general aviation AOA
equipment research project funded by the FAA’s Partnership to Enhance General
Aviation Safety, Accessibility and Sustainability (PEGASAS). With assistance from
researchers at Ohio State University and Florida Institute of Technology, this project
aims to develop AOA educational materials for general aviation as well as conduct a
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cost/benefit/risk analysis of various supplemental AOA systems for general aviation
aircraft. Results of this study are expected in 2015 (PEGASAS, 2014).
A limitation inhibiting more detailed quantitative research is the lack of flight data
monitoring systems on most general aviation aircraft. Even where flight data recording
was and is available, previous and current work has been limited to “snapshot data” of
specific points in time. Investigators were forced to build a picture of dynamic flight
conditions by interpreting static data. As part of the University of North Dakota’s Flight
Data Monitoring program, snapshot data of all training flights has been collected on
Garmin G1000 secure digital (SD) cards and more recently by Appareo flight data
recorders. To overcome previous static data limitations, the university recently
developed a tool designed to analyze dynamically produced data all along an airplane’s
approach path and then used it for an initial investigation of turns from base to final
preceding the approach, since this flight regime represents a worst “low and slow” case,
where insufficient altitude might be available to recover from an inadvertent stall. This
initial study examined approaches before and after AOA system installation on the same
aircraft. Data analyzed represented 11,324 turns to final at eight different airports and on
20 different runways. Subjects flying the aircraft were unaware their performance was
being measured, no training in use of the AOA instrumentation was provided, and no
pilot surveys were administered as part of the resultant analysis. During the turn to final,
AOA-equipped aircraft lowered the nose more and experienced more aggressive G
loading than non-AOA-equipped aircraft. Both of these findings imply AOA equipment
might be providing enhanced pilot situational awareness of the wing’s full performance
envelope—lowering the nose to reduce AOA during flight near the critical AOA, but
6

flying more aggressively when excess lift performance is available. Some conflicting
results appeared based on seasonal differences, specifically in varying combinations of
outside air temperature and pressure altitude, so initial results were considered
encouraging, but not conclusive (Higgins, 2014).
Despite having only a small collection of quantifiable data illustrating the safety
enhancement provided by AOA instrumentation in general aviation aircraft, the Loss of
Control Work Group issued recommendations for use based on a long period of military
experience with AOA systems and the intuitive benefits provided by increased situational
awareness. “The GA community should embrace to the fullest extent the stall margin
awareness benefits of these systems. To help the GA community understand the safety
benefits of AOA systems, a public education campaign should be developed…”
(Namowitz, 2013, p. 1). The GAJSC does seek to make its work data driven to ensure
analytical credibility that would allow the FAA and industry to plan for implementation
(FAA GAJSC, 2012). The present study expands on initial University of North Dakota
research to enhance the quality and quantity of data available to the FAA as well as
provide a basis for the public education campaign called for by Namowitz.
Background--Genesis in Military Aviation
High performance military aircraft have incorporated AOA systems into their
avionics for many years. Rob Hickman, founder of Advanced Flight Systems, a
manufacturer of supplemental AOA systems, uses this experience as a main sales point
for his products by explaining that AOA has long been the main measure used by U.S.
Navy aircraft approaching carriers (Hirschman, 2011).
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An aircraft and AOA system representative of military high performance aircraft
in general is the Northrop T-38 Talon, a two-seat, twin-engine supersonic jet trainer
flown by the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy Test Pilot School, and NASA.
The T-38 AOA system includes a heated vane transmitter on the right forward
fuselage (Figure 3), a CPU-115/A computer, and in each cockpit, an AOA indicator,

Figure 3. Northrop T-38 Talon
indexer, and indexer lights dimmer control (Figure 4). The AOA system compensates for
flap and landing gear configurations, and presents the following displays in each cockpit:
optimum AOA for final approach, AOA when buffet and stall will occur, and
approximate AOA for maximum range and maximum endurance (USAF, 1978).
An AOA dial (Figure 4) on the upper left of each instrument panel is calibrated in
units of 0.1 counterclockwise from 0 to 1.1. Each unit represents approximately 10
percent of aircraft lift. The dial is marked with maximum range (.18), maximum
endurance (.3), optimum final approach (.6), buffet warning (.9-1.0), and stall warning
8

AOA (1.0-1.1). AOA indexer lights (Figure 4) mounted on each glare shield are
operative in the landing configuration with flaps up or down, or when landing gear is up
and flaps are extended 5 percent or more. The high speed indexer is inoperative when
landing gear and flaps are up to eliminate continuous illumination during cruise flight.
All three symbols illuminate to indicate system failure (USAF, 1978).

Figure 4. T-38 Flight Manual--AOA System and Displays (USAF, 1978, p. 4-10)
9

Bringing Supplemental Add-On AOA Systems to General Aviation
In its Safety Enhancement 1, the Loss of Control Work Group’s Statement of
Work recommends,
To reduce the risk of inadvertent stall/departure resulting in LOC [loss of control]
accidents, the GA community should install and use AOA based systems for
better awareness of stall margin…GA aircraft manufacturers should work to
develop cost effective AOA installations for new and existing designs currently in
production. Owners and operators of GA aircraft should be encouraged to have
AOA systems installed in their aircraft (FAA GAJSC, 2012, p. 16)
In response to this recommendation, the FAA sought to simplify the approval
process for post-production equipment to be installed on previously certified aircraft.
FAA Memorandum AIR100-14-110-PM01 established design requirements for
supplemental AOA systems. An AOA system must be a stand-alone unit and must not
interface with a currently certificated system, with the exception of an electrical power
supply. AOA instruments must contain markings or placards stating “Not for use as a
primary instrument for flight.” Finally, supplemental AOA systems may not be installed
on commuter or transport category airplanes (Hempe & Seipel, 2014).
Traditional systems sense AOA through external heated vanes mounted on the
side of the fuselage. While these systems are precise, they are also expensive, and may
be cost prohibitive for light general aviation aircraft use. Non-Technical Standard Order
systems for general aviation aircraft as described in the FAA memorandum are usually
sold as kits costing $600 to $1500. Rather than a vane, these systems employ other
means of detecting angle of attack. A fixed, under-wing mast completely separate from
the aircraft’s pitot/static system with ports measuring differential air pressure may be
used. Static ports installed on the top and bottom of the wing surface measure differential
air pressure without an external probe. Other systems use a pitot tube and static port
10

combination to measure differential air pressure. Finally, the wing leading edge stall
warning tab can be replaced by a heated lift transducer designed to transmit AOA data to
a primary flight display and/or AOA instrument. Because they are separate from existing
aircraft systems, any of the AOA systems designed for supplemental general aviation use
can provide backup information to safely recover the aircraft in the event of a blocked
pitot tube or failed airspeed indicator (Hirschman, 2011).
Existing AOA Systems for General Aviation
Companies currently manufacturing AOA indicators for general aviation include
Advanced Flight Systems, Alpha Systems, BendixKing, Dynon, Garmin, InAir
Instruments, and Safe Flight Instrument Corporation. Descriptions of each of these AOA
systems follow.
Advanced Flight Systems Pro III and Sport
Advanced Flight Systems, Inc., a Dynon Avionics company, manufactures two different
standalone systems, the AOA Pro III and AOA Sport (Figure 5). Both sense dynamic
pressures with two pressure ports in the installed probe mounted under the wing.

Figure 5. left to right: Advanced Flight Systems AOA probe, Pro III, and Sport
(Advanced Flight Systems, 2014)
The AOA Pro III is a liquid crystal display with 26 colored segments. It includes a voice
warning system announcing high AOA and landing gear position errors. AOA is
11

displayed in both digital and analog formats (Advanced Flight Systems AOA Pro III,
2014). The AOA Pro III has a retail price of $1,495. The AOA Sport is designed for
tight instrument panels and can be installed between instruments or on the glare shield. It
has a retail price of $890 (Advanced Flight Systems Products, 2014).
Alpha Systems
The Alpha Systems AOA system was designed to meet the objective of FAA
Advisory Circular AC23.1309-1C to improve the safety of the general aviation airplane
fleet as a standalone device increasing pilot situational awareness when operating at high
angles of attack. An AOA probe is mounted under the wing, replacing an existing
inspection cover. The probe faces forward at approximately a 50 degree downward angle
from the horizontal. Two sensor ports measure the differential pressure. A control
module interprets the AOA probe data and sends it to one of a variety of displays
installed in the cockpit (Alpha Systems, 2014).
Griffin, Falcon, Eagle
Griffin, Falcon, and Eagle (Figure 6) are “top of the glare shield” displays
designed to provide accurate real time AOA indications in the pilot’s line of sight in a

Figure 6. left to right: Alpha Systems Griffin, Falcon, Eagle (Alpha Systems, 2014)
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manner similar to military systems. Each kit weighs less than three pounds and has a
retail price of $1,995.
Valkyrie Heads Up Display Adapter
The Valkyrie Heads Up Display (HUD) adapter takes the Griffin, Eagle, or
Falcon display and projects it as a HUD display (Figure 7). The retail price is $500.

Figure 7. Alpha Systems Valkyrie HUD (Alpha Systems, 2014)
Condor, Hawk, Dragon, Merlin
Condor, Hawk, Dragon, and Merlin (Figure 8) provide a “lift reserve” display in
circular and rectangular formats. Condor and Hawk are flush mounted instrument panel

Figure 8. left to right: Alpha Systems Condor, Hawk, Dragon, bottom Merlin (Alpha
Systems, 2014)
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displays, while Dragon is a dash mount version of the Hawk. Merlin is a light bar display
suitable for amounting above or below the glare shield. Each kit weighs less than three
pounds and has a retail price of $1,995.
Bendix King KLR 10
The BendixKing KLR 10 measures differential air pressures at two points on an
AOA probe mounted to the wing, converts the pressures into an electronic signal in the
KLR 10 IF module, and transmits an electronic signal to a 2.25 inch LED indicator
mounted on top of the airplane’s glare shield (Figure 9). Mutable audio warnings of

Figure 9. BendixKing KLR 10 (BendixKing, 2014)
“Check AOA;” “Caution, Too Slow;” and “Too Slow! Too Slow!” are added to the visual
indications as the aircraft approaches critical AOA. A photo cell in the instrument
detects ambient light changes and automatically switches from daytime to nighttime
brightness presets. Manual control allows the pilot to fine tune instrument brightness.
The system draws less than 250mA of electrical power, and if an optional probe heater is
added, requires less than eight amps at 12 or 24VDC to operate. A calibrated system will
have +/- three percent accuracy, which is maintained over a sideslip range of +/- 15
degrees. The KLR 10 installation kit has a retail price of $1,450 (BendixKing, 2014).
14

Dynon Avionics FlightDEK-D180
Dynon Avionics offers AOA/pitot probes to support AOA instrumentation
integral to various Electronic Flight Instrument Systems (EFIS). Rather than serving as
an add-on sensor, the AOA/pitot probe is designed to replace the standard pitot tube on
experimental aircraft and provide inputs to both airspeed indicators and AOA indicators
included on supported EFIS. The normal pitot pressure port is on the front face of the
tube, while the second pressure port is on an angled surface below the pitot port (Figure
10). Separate air lines run to the avionics, where they are translated into AOA (Dynon
Avionics, 2014).
Three versions of the AOA/Pitot tube are available: standard L-shaped tubes in
heated and unheated versions, and a boom-mount version (Figure 11). Retail prices
range from $200 to $450 (Dynon Avionics, 2014).

Figure 10. Dual purpose Dynon Avionics AOA/Pitot tube operation (Dynon Avionics,
2014)
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Figure 11. Dynon Avionics AOA/Pitot tubes (Dynon Avionics, 2014)
Garmin GI 260
The Garmin GI 260 calculates AOA using pitot, AOA, and static air pressure
inputs. The system consists of the GI 260 indicator, GAP 26 probe, and the GSU 25 air
data computer (Figure 12). The probe sends pitot and AOA air pressures to the GSU 25.
The air data computer then combines this data with an independent static source to
calculate AOA and sends it to the indicator.

Figure 12. Garmin AOA system components (Garmin, 2014)
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The GI 260 indicator displays AOA information via ten color-coded LED annunciators
(Figure 13). When connected to an audio system, it generates aural alerts as the aircraft
approaches critical AOA (Garmin, 2014).

Figure 13. Garmin GI 260 display (Garmin, 2014)
The system automatically arms as the aircraft accelerates past 50 knots. Visual
displays begin immediately after arming and aural warnings become active 15 seconds
after arming to avoid premature alerts during the takeoff roll. The Garmin AOA system
retail price is $1,649 (Garmin, 2014).
InAir Instruments Lift Reserve Indicator
InAir Instruments’ Lift Reserve Indicator (Figure 14) integrates both airspeed and
AOA into a single continuous readout. The system includes a rectangular airstream
probe mounted on the underside of a wing and a display gauge. Two air pressure ports
on the probe are piped to the instrument display, which calculates lift reserve from the
differential pressure. The LRI is complementary to the airplane’s airspeed indicator and
can serve as a backup in the event of a primary system failure. Retail price for a system
with an unheated probe is $450. The heated system has a $550 retail price (InAir
Instruments, 2014).
17

Figure 14. InAir Instruments Lift Reserve Indicator (InAir Instruments, 2014)
Safe Flight SCx
In July 2014, Safe Flight Instrument Corporation announced a new leading edge
AOA system designed for the experimental, homebuilt, and kit plane market called the
SCx (Figure 15).

Figure 15. Safe Flight SCx Lift Transducer and Indexer Computer (Safe Flight, News
Release, 2014)
The SCx was to be followed by the SCc system for FAA certificated aircraft in late 2014.
Like other AOA systems, the SCx provides improved high AOA situational awareness
through a combined visual display and audio output. Unique to the SCx however, is the
lift transducer mounted at the leading edge of the wing to measure the leading edge
stagnation point and air flow field (Safe Flight news release, 2014). The stagnation point
refers to the area where airflow divides to flow over the top and bottom wing surfaces.
18

Local air flow at this point has maximum pressure and zero airspeed, and its location is
uniquely related to the wing’s angle of attack. As distance from the stagnation point
increases, so does local airspeed. The lift transducer measures the force of local airspeed
with respect to the stagnation point (Safe Flight, 2013).
By correlating lift with airflow characteristics at the stagnation point on the wing,
the SCx Lift Transducer measures precise changes in AOA and provides the
output interpreted and displayed by the SCx Indexer Computer…By placing the
sensing element where the action is—at the leading edge, you have the most
accurate and dependable measurement of AOA (Safe Flight SCx, 2014, p. 1).
Best speeds for maximum range, maximum endurance, short field landing speed, etc. are
actually best angles of attack. Aircraft speeds listed in the Pilot’s Operating Handbook
are always calculated for the airplane’s maximum gross weight, and are merely the
corresponding airspeed for a specific angle of attack (Safe Flight, 2013). Flying at lesser
weights without supplemental AOA instrumentation leaves the pilot with no way to
measure these best speeds with precision.
Purpose
The intent of this two-phase, sequential mixed methods study is to test the theory
that the number of stalls in the traffic pattern in light general aviation aircraft can be
reduced when aircraft are equipped with supplemental angle of attack instrumentation
designed to provide the pilot continuous situational awareness regarding remaining lift
available for the current aircraft configuration and flight conditions. In the first phase,
quantitative research questions addressed the relationship between stabilized approaches
and installation of supplemental AOA systems. Independent variables include AOA
system installed, presence of vertical guidance system, time of day (day or night), outside
air temperature, presence of an air traffic control tower, and length and width of runway.
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Three dependent variables measure aspects of approach stability—airspeed differential
from optimum, height differential from optimum, and cross track error from extended
runway centerline. Information from this first phase was explored further in a second
qualitative phase. Safety surveys of flight instructors and students were used to probe
significant findings regarding AOA system contributions to flying stabilized approaches.
These follow up surveys were designed to better understand the quantitative results as
well as collect information useful to developing future training.
Research Questions
1. Are general aviation pilots more likely to fly a stabilized approach in aircraft
equipped with supplemental AOA systems than in aircraft not so equipped?
a. Does the presence of vertical guidance systems (visual such as VASI or
PAPI lighting or electronic such as ILS) affect stabilized approach rates?
b. Does time of day (day or night) affect stabilized approach rates?
c. Does outside air temperature affect stabilized approach rates?
d. Does the presence of an air traffic control tower affect stabilized approach
rates?
e. Do runway characteristics (length and width) affect stabilized approach
rates?
f. Does the type of AOA system installed on the aircraft affect stabilized
approach rates?
2. Are general aviation pilots who fly AOA-equipped aircraft more likely to execute
a go-around if they encounter an unstable approach than those flying aircraft not
so equipped?
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3. How do pilots not previously trained with AOA instrumentation react to the
presence of AOA systems on their aircraft and what revised training do they
recommend?
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
As part of its flight data monitoring program, the University of North Dakota
records inflight data from Cessna 172 Garmin 1000 avionics on to Secure Digital (SD)
cards. More recently, Appareo flight data recorders have also been introduced. These
systems allow for collection of many inflight variables useful to providing safety analysis
for the university’s flight training program. An integral part of any aviation safety
program is avoiding using safety analysis as an enforcement tool against pilots who may
have violated FAA regulations or local training rules since it would discourage
acceptance of flight data monitoring systems and full disclosure of safety information
helpful to analysis and future safety lessons learned. In order to protect the integrity of
the safety analysis system, the University of North Dakota designed its flight data
monitoring data base to protect the identity of involved pilots.
For the quantitative phase of this study, subjects were student pilots and
instructors assigned to fly University of North Dakota Cessna 172s, but specific
identifying data for each flight describing other characteristics such as flight experience,
gender, or ethnic group, were not directly available. Since all subject aircraft flights of
relevant airframes were examined during the time period of interest, demographic
characteristics of those enrolled in university flying training programs in general will
serve as a substitute to describe the general aviation certificated pilots and student pilots
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whose performance was examined. Students participating in the flight program are those
enrolled in the following academic programs: commercial aviation, air traffic control,
airport management, aviation management, aviation technology management, flight
education, and Unmanned Aircraft Systems operations. Table 1 illustrates the gender and
ethnic group representation of students enrolled in these seven academic programs during
the fall semester of 2012, the most recent academic year for which published data is
available (University of North Dakota Institutional Research, 2015).
During the qualitative phase of this study, safety surveys of the university’s
students and flight instructors were completely anonymous. The only demographic data
provided by these surveys was level of pilot certification, from student pilot through
flight instructor. This data is included with survey results in Chapter III.
Equipment
The University of North Dakota has equipped three of its Cessna 172 aircraft,
each with a different AOA system: a Bendix King KLR 10 was installed on aircraft
N529ND on March 18, 2014 (Figure 16); a pre-production Safe Flight SCx was installed
on aircraft N524ND on April 17, 2014 (Figure 17); and a Garmin GI 260 was installed on
aircraft N525ND on May 28, 2014 (Figure 18) (Higgins, 2014). Each of these aircraft is
equipped with G1000 SD cards or Appareo recorders identical to the rest of the
university’s aircraft fleet of 63 Cessna 172s.
The University of North Dakota’s flight data monitoring program is the secure
repository for all inflight data. A proprietary “turn-to-final” analysis tool was used to
analyze each turn to final in terms of airport and runway, date, outside air temperature,
day or night light conditions, turn direction, time in turn, altitude23
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Figure 16. Bendix King KLR 10 Installation on N529ND

Figure 17. Safe Flight Prototype Installation on N524ND

Figure 18. Garmin GI 260 Installation on N525ND
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start/stop/maximum/minimum, indicated airspeed-start/stop/maximum/minimum, vertical
speed indication-start/stop/maximum/minimum, pitch-start/stop/maximum/minimum,
roll-start/stop/maximum/minimum, engine RPM-start/stop/maximum/minimum, and
groundspeed. “Start/stop/maximum/minimum” refers to measurements of the specific
variable taken from the beginning of the turn to final (start) until the turn is completed
(stop). Maximum and minimum refer to the largest and smallest values of the variable
measured during the turn. Similarly, a proprietary “dynamic approach” analysis tool
translated approach data from 200 feet above ground level (AGL) until approximately
four seconds prior to touchdown, measured at a 1Hz rate, into a dynamic picture of each
approach. Four seconds prior to touchdown was chosen as an end point because
equipment limitations preclude measuring the exact point of touchdown. Flight data
monitoring does not include radar altitude (aircraft are not equipped with a radar
altimeter), weight on wheels determination is not available, and flap position is not
recorded. Data points collected include: airport and runway, outside air temperature, day
or night light conditions, height above touchdown differential (desired vs. actual), cross
track error, date, time, time spent on final, indicated airspeed differential (desired vs.
actual), and wind component.
Procedure
In the quantitative phase of this study, data collected and analyzed was extracted
from the University of North Dakota’s flight data monitoring program database. All data
was recorded in a naturalistic flight training environment with all subjects unaware of
what performance parameters were measured. Once quantitative data collection was
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complete, a qualitative safety survey was administered to expand on initial findings and
focus on future training requirements.
This study analyzes aircraft traffic patterns, flown from base leg to final approach
through completion of the approach (full stop landing, touch and go landing, or low
approach) between October 1, 2013 and December 31, 2014 (n = 1,644) for the three
University of North Dakota Cessna 172 aircraft modified with supplemental AOA
instrumentation. Knowing the AOA equipment installation date for each aircraft and
choosing an analysis period beginning in advance of modification allowed data to be
compared for unmodified and modified aircraft where the only configuration change was
installation of supplemental AOA instrumentation. Data for the entire subject population
is available, so sampling procedures designed to select a subset of the population were
not required.
While many similar operational definitions are in use, no standardized definition
of stabilized approach exists. For purposes of this study, stabilized approach was
determined by an analyzed approach meeting the following parameters: airspeed 56-71
KIAS (+10/-5 knots of optimum approach speed), altitude +/-33 feet of desired glide
slope, and cross track error of less than +/-100 feet. The airspeed parameter reflects the
FAA’s acceptable final approach standard for private pilots (FAA, 2011). The altitude
parameter is equivalent to reaching full scale deflection of the ILS glide slope display at
200 AGL or high (all white lights)/low (all red lights) on visual approach lighting systems
(PAPI or VASI). The cross track error parameter is equivalent to full-scale deflection of
the course display for a commonly installed localizer signal at approximately 3,800 feet
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from the ILS glide slope point of intercept with the runway (where the aircraft is at
approximately 200 AGL on a three-degree glide slope).
For training, the University of North Dakota uses a slightly more strict definition.
By 200 AGL, all checklists must be complete, the aircraft must be on course centerline
and glideslope, configured for landing, and at an airspeed of 61 KIAS -0/+5 with power
set. An altitude of 200 AGL represents approximately 45 seconds prior to aircraft
touchdown. This “time to go” to landing is similar to stabilized approach checkpoints
used by larger professional operators at higher altitudes and airspeeds where an approach
must be stable in order to continue to a landing (Kugler, 2014). Figure 19 displays
typical stabilized approach checkpoints used by the University of North Dakota flying
training program, some Part 135 operators, some Part 121 operators, and some U.S. Air
Force commands.
The independent variable AOA status was determined by the aircraft tail number
and date of the flight. The airport and runway to which an approach was flown was
determined by GPS position. From this information, independent variables vertical
guidance, air traffic control present, runway length, and runway width were determined.
Time and date stamp allowed the independent variable day or night to be determined.
Measured outside air temperature was selected to study previously observed seasonal
effects.
Design
This study is a two-phase, sequential mixed methods design. Quantitative
measures of performance parameters in a naturalistic setting were collected and analyzed
to address the first two research questions about AOA instrumentation performance.
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These questions were addressed in terms of supplemental AOA systems generally, and
also specifically in terms of the three systems installed on University of North Dakota
aircraft. A qualitative safety survey collected data from pilots in the University of North

Figure 19. Approach speed vs. time to touchdown for typical stabilized approach
checkpoints (Kugler, 2014)
Dakota flight training program to examine the second and third research questions as well
as provide additional perspective to conclusions reached from quantitative analysis.
Statistical Analysis
With three continuous dependent variables describing stabilized approaches
considered one parameter at a time (speed differential, height differential, and cross track
error), and seven categorical or continuous independent variables, multiple regression is
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the appropriate statistical test. Main effects were examined for the independent variables
for all aircraft in the population. Specific AOA systems were also examined separately to
see if they influenced performance against the control (unmodified aircraft).
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Flight Data Monitoring Analysis
The primary flight data analysis was conducted using simultaneous multiple
regressions. This type of regression analysis tests the significance of each independent
variable after all other predictors are included in the model. Independent variables
included AOA modification status, presence of vertical guidance, day or night lighting
conditions, outside air temperature, presence of air traffic control, runway length and
runway width. Dependent variables represent elements of stabilized approach: speed
differential, height differential, and cross track error. Means, standard deviations, and
ranges for each of the continuous independent variables and dependent variables are
listed in Table 2. Frequencies for each of the categorical independent variables are
presented in Table 3.
Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges.
Mean

Standard Deviation

Range

Speed Differential (kts.)

4.25

4.53

-51.19 - 25.31

Height Differential (ft.)

6.45

26.13

-203.04 - 148.19

Cross Track Error (ft.)

0.57

34.53

-504.35 - 472.57

Temperature (deg C)

6.22

14.24

-28.07 - 44.12

Runway Length (ft.)

4,576.67

1,411.85

3,199.00 - 7,351.00

Runway Width (ft.)

90.03

30.65

60.00 - 150.00
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Table 3. Frequencies.
AOA Status

not modified

SafeFlight

Garmin

BendixKing

814

285

183

362

no

yes

59

1,585

night

day

Day or Night

209

1,435

no

yes

ATC present

242

1,402

Vertical Guidance present

Data was gathered for 1,644 approaches flown to 14 different runways at four
different airports (Grand Forks International Airport, Grand Forks, ND; Crookston
Municipal Kirkwood Field, Crookston, MN; Hutson Field, Grafton, ND; and Warren
Municipal Airport, Warren, MN). Diagrams of each airport, similar to those found in the
FAA’s Airport/Facility Directory, are available in Appendix C.
Outliers
Simple boxplots were constructed for each continuous variable to identify outliers
in the data. A boxplot defines outliers by these criteria: values that are 1.5 times the
interquartile range greater than the 75th percentile or 1.5 times the interquartile range less
than the 25th percentile for each variable. Among the dependent variables, 16 outliers
were identified for speed differential (Figure 20), 22 outliers were identified for height
differential (Figure 21), and 36 outliers were identified for cross track error (Figure 22).
Each of the outlier cases among the dependent variables was examined in more detail
using additional flight data collected for that approach. Of these outliers, 28 appeared to
be possible go-arounds in progress (see data measurement limitations in Chapter IV), and
were eliminated from the data set because the approach appears to have been terminated.
Some of the possible go-arounds were grouped by date in such a way that they may
represent instrument training in progress where intentional low or missed approaches are
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common as part of the training curriculum. Eight other outliers remained unexplained by
comparison with other data for the same approach. In these cases, scores were changed
to the mean plus two standard deviations in the direction of the discrepancy, where they
yielded logical values for the applicable variable (Field, 2009).

Figure 20. Speed Differential Outliers
Among the independent variables, no outliers were identified for outside air
temperature. For runway length (Figure 23), 12 outliers were identified, and for runway
width (Figure 24), 15 outliers were identified, but all cases represented actual runways
included in the data and thus, remain included for analysis. Their actual values just
happened to be extreme within this data set.
Adjusted means, standard deviations, and ranges for each of the continuous
independent variables and dependent variables, after accounting for outliers, are listed in
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Table 4. Adjusted frequencies for each of the categorical independent variables are
presented in Table 5.

Figure 21. Height Differential Outliers

Figure 22. Cross Track Error Outliers
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Figure 23. Runway Length Outliers

Figure 24. Runway Width Outliers
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Table 4. Adjusted Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges.
Standard
Mean
Deviation
Speed Differential
(kts.)
4.25
3.78

Range
-4.81 - 23.98

Height Differential (ft.)

5.77

24.14

-79.00 - 129.50

Cross Track Error (ft.)

0.47

24.14

-185.75 - 266.77

Temperature (deg C)

6.31

14.20

-28.07 - 44.12

Runway Length (ft.)

4,588.72

1,417.49

3199.00 7351.00

Runway Width (ft.)

90.24

30.81

60.00 - 150.00

Table 5. Adjusted Frequencies.
not
modified
AOA Status
798
no
Vertical Guidance
present
52
night
Day or Night
203
no
ATC present
231

SafeFlight
279
yes

Garmin
181

BendixKing
358

1,564
day
1,413
yes
1,385

Correlation and collinearity
In multiple regression analysis, the independent variables should approach
independence (Field, 2009). Bivariate correlations between the independent variables
and the dependent variables are presented in Table 6. These correlations suggest an
acceptable level of collinearity, except for the strong correlation between runway length
and runway width. To avoid errors in the multiple regression analysis, runway width was
eliminated from the regression analysis.
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Table 6. Correlations of Independent and Dependent Variables.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1. Speed Diff.

--

2. Height Diff.

.147**

--

3. Cross Track Error

.034

.038

--

4. AOA Status

.002

.048

-.001

--

5. Vertical Guidance

-.026

-.270**

-.044

-.037

--

.117**

.019

.050*

-.005

-.048

--

7. Air Temperature

-.013

.080**

.013

.494**

.006

.032

--

8. Presence of ATC

-.061*

-.211**

-.036

-.059*

.446**

.032

.014

--

9. Runway Length

.155**

-.186**

.036

-.041

.179**

.010

.020

.185**

--

10. Runway Width

.156**

-.163**

.037

-.046

.090**

.006

.024

.206**

.987**

6. Day or Night

10

--

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Normality
The continuous variables speed differential, height differential, cross track error,
temperature, and runway length were tested for normality using the KolmogorovSmirnov (K-S) test after adjustments were made to the data set to account for outliers.
The test statistic for the K-S test is signified by D and the degrees of freedom are placed
in parentheses after the D. Variables speed differential, D(1616) = .08, p < .05, height
differential, D(1616) = .12, p < .05, cross track error, D(1616) = .14, p < .05, temperature,
D(1616) = .072, p < .05, and runway length, D(1616) = .38, p < .05, were all significantly
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non-normal. In large samples however, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test can be significant
even when the scores are only slightly different from a normal distribution (Field, 2009).
To further investigate normality, Q-Q plots of each continuous variable were constructed
and are presented in Figures 25 through 29.

Figure 25. Q-Q plot of Speed Differential

Figure 26. Q-Q plot of Height Differential
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Figure 27. Q-Q plot of Cross Track Error

Figure 28. Q-Q plot of Temperature
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Figure 29. Q-Q plot of Runway Length
Examining the Q-Q plots reveals that each of the continuous variables seems to
deviate only slightly from a normal distribution. Normal distribution of speed
differential, height differential, cross track error, temperature, and runway length was
assumed for further analysis.
Multiple Regression Analysis
The six independent variables were entered into a multiple regression analysis by
the forced entry method, where all independent variables were placed into the regression
model simultaneously. This results in each independent variable being tested after all
other variables have been entered into the model. Separate analyses were conducted for
each of the dependent variables. Results are reported in Tables 7 through 9. The
significance of each independent variable was tested with degrees of freedom of 1 and
1615. The regression coefficient (b) estimates the amount of change in the dependent
variables associated with one unit change in the independent variable. This value also
indicates how much a specific independent variable affects the dependent variable if all
40

other independent variables are held constant. Beta weight (β) is a standardized slope
coefficient allowing comparison of each of the independent variables’ predictive strength.
Beta indicates the number of standard deviations the dependent variable will change for
one standard deviation change in the independent variable. The t-test measures whether
the independent variable is making a significant contribution to the regression model.
Larger values of t indicate larger contributions of that independent variable to the model.
The squared semi-partial correlation (part r) represents the proportion of variance in the
dependent variable accounted for by each of the independent variables after all other
variables were included in the regression equation.
For analysis, each independent variable was coded numerically for entry into the
regression formula. AOA status was coded as zero for an unmodified airplane and one
for a modified airplane. No vertical guidance available for the runway analyzed was
coded zero and coded one for the presence of glide path guidance, whether guidance was
via a lighting system or via radio signal from the instrument landing system. For day or
night, night was coded as zero and day was coded as one. Outside air temperature was
entered as a continuous variable in degrees Celsius. Presence of air traffic control
referred to whether an operating control tower was on the airport being analyzed. No
ATC was coded as zero and ATC present was coded as one. Finally, runway length was
entered as a continuous variable with a value measured in feet.
The dependent variable speed differential refers to the deviation in knots indicated
airspeed from the optimum 61 KIAS approach airspeed for the Cessna 172. A positive
value denotes an approach at faster than optimum airspeed and a negative value denotes
an approach slower than optimum airspeed.
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Table 7. Regression Results for Speed Differential.
B
t
part r
β
AOA modified

.0884

.0117

.3750

.0001

Vertical Guidance

-.3032

-.0142

-.5163

.0001

Day or Night

1.3077

.1147

4.7019*

.0131

Temperature

-.0038

-.0141

-.4528

.0001

ATC Present

-.8905

-.0825

-3.0079* .0054

Runway Length

.0005

.1739

6.9684*

.0288

* significant at the .05 level
The overall regression model for speed differential was significant, R2 = .05, R2adj
= .04, F(6,1615) = 12.87, p = .00. Day or night, presence of air traffic control, and
runway length significantly contributed to the regression model. Day approaches resulted
in higher speed differential. The presence of air traffic control resulted in lower speed
differential. Longer runways resulted in higher speed differential.
The dependent variable height differential refers to the deviation in feet from the
optimum 200 AGL where the approach was analyzed. A positive value denotes an
approach higher than optimum altitude and a negative value denotes an approach lower
than optimum altitude.
The overall regression model for height differential was significant, R2 = .11, R2adj
= .10, F(6,1615) = 31.84, p = .00. Vertical guidance, temperature, presence of air traffic
control, and runway length significantly contributed to the regression model. Presence of
vertical guidance resulted in a lower height differential. Higher outside air temperature
resulted in a higher height differential. Presence of air traffic control resulted in a lower
42

Table 8. Regression Results for Height
Differential.
B
β

t

part r

AOA modified

-1.3180

-.0273

-.9044

.0005

Vertical Guidance

-28.1043

-.2055

-7.7428*

.0333

Day or Night

.5512

.0076

.3206

.0001

Temperature

.1602

.0942

3.1277*

.0054

ATC Present

-6.5378

-.0948

-3.5720*

.0071

Runway Length

-.0022

-.1314

-5.4415*

.0165

* significant at the .05 level
height differential. Longer runways resulted in a lower height differential.
The dependent variable cross track error refers to the deviation right or left of the
extended runway centerline measured in feet. A positive value denotes an approach right
of centerline and a negative value denotes an approach left of centerline.
The overall regression model for cross track error was not significant, R2 = .01,
R2adj = .00, F(6,1615) = 2.03, p = .06. Day approaches significantly reduced cross track
error in the regression model. No variables significantly predicted effects on cross track
error.
Additional analysis was conducted for each of the dependent variables
considering the AOA status in more detail. AOA status was divided into four categories,
unmodified aircraft, aircraft with the SafeFlight system installed, aircraft with the Garmin
system installed, and aircraft with the BendixKing system installed. A dummy code
system was established to represent each of these variables in terms of zeros and ones.
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Table 9. Regression Results for Cross Track Error.
B
t
β

part r

AOA modified

-.5220

-.0112

-.3523

.0001

Vertical Guidance

-5.8176

-.0441

-1.5763

.0015

Day or Night

-3.6769

-.0523

-2.1032* .0027

Temperature

.0313

.0191

.6002

.0002

ATC Present

-1.8087

-.0272

-.9719

.0006

.0008

.0480

1.8864

.0022

Runway Length

* significant at the .05 level
The baseline, or control, group, assigned all zeros, was unmodified aircraft. Three
variables were created to see how each of the individual AOA systems might have had an
influence on performance against the control (unmodified aircraft). Dummy variable A1
represented the SafeFlight system. Dummy variable A2 represented the Garmin system,
and dummy variable A3 represented the Bendix King system. The dummy coding
assignments are presented at Table 10. Results are reported in Tables 11 through 13.
The significance of each independent variable was tested with degrees of freedom of 1
and 1615.
Table 10. Dummy Coding Assignments.
No modification

A1
0

A2
0

A3
0

SafeFlight AOA

1

0

0

Garmin AOA

0

1

0

BendixKing AOA

0

0

1
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The regression slopes and beta weights listed in Tables 11 through 13 compare each of
the AOA systems to the control group of unmodified aircraft. A one unit change
represents the difference between the mean of the group specified and the mean of the
control group.
Table 11. Regression Results for Speed Differential
(AOA).
B
t
part r
β
SafeFlight AOA

-.0768 -.0077 -.2920 .0001

Garmin AOA

-.0660 -.0055 -.2120 .0000

BendixKing AOA

.0377

.0041

.1568

.0000

* significant at the .05 level
The regression model for speed differential was not significant, R2 = .00, R2adj =
.00, F(3,1615) = .06, p = .98. None of the independent variables significantly contributed
to the regression model. None of the variables significantly predicted speed differential.
Table 12. Regression Results for Height Differential
(AOA).
B
t
part r
β
SafeFlight AOA

3.1469 .0493

1.8765

.0022

Garmin AOA

.1384

.0697

.0000

BendixKing AOA

3.3520 .0577 2.1854* .0029

.0018

* significant at the .05 level
The best and only significant predictor of height differential was the BendixKing
system with a very small correlation coefficient of .045. The regression model for height
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differential was not significant, R2 = .00, R2adj = .00, F(3,1615) = 2.32, p = .07, even
though the BendixKing system was statistically significant by itself. Given the very
small correlation of the BendixKing system with height differential and the lack of
significance of the overall regression model, none of the variables appeared to have
predicted height differential.
Table 13. Regression Results for Cross Track Error
(AOA).
B
t
part r
β
SafeFlight AOA

.4327

.0070

.2668

.0000

Garmin AOA

-.1591 -.0022 -.0829 .0000

BendixKing AOA

-.0367 -.0007 -.0248 .0000

* significant at the .05 level
The regression model for cross track error was not significant, R2 = .00, R2adj =
.00, F(3,1615) = .03, p = .99. None of the independent variables significantly contributed
to the regression model. None of the variables significantly predicted cross track error.
To check for effects on overall approach stability, each dependent variable
representing an element of a stabilized approach was converted to a z-score and then the
sum of those z-scores was entered into the original regression. The additional dependent
variable zsum refers to the sum of the z-scores for speed differential, height differential,
and cross track error. Regression results are reported in Table 14.
The overall regression model for zsum was significant, R2 = .05, R2adj = .05,
F(6,1615) = 13.58, p = .00. Vertical guidance and ATC present significantly contributed
to the regression model. Both vertical guidance and ATC present resulted in smaller
46

Table 14. Regression Results for zsum.
B
β
-.0145

t

part r

-.4643

.0001

AOA modified

-.0536

Vertical Guidance

-1.4941 -.1423 -5.1941* .0160

Day or Night

.2110

.0377

1.5484

.0014

Temperature

.0070

.0535

1.7208

.0018

ATC Present

-.5840

-.1103 -4.0265* .0096

Runway Length

.0001

.0488

1.9571

.0022

* significant at the .05 level
deviations from the optimum approach, so contributed positively to stabilized
approaches.
Safety Survey
An online survey of students and instructors flying University of North Dakota
Cessna 172 aircraft was conducted from February 23 through March 10, 2015. Survey
web pages are included in Appendix B. Surveys were submitted by 98 participants.
Of 97 participants responding to the question “Which of the following is the
highest level FAA pilot certificate you hold?” 14 (14.43%) were student pilots, 36
(37.11%) were private pilots, seven (7.22%) were commercial pilots, and 40 (41.24%)
held flight instructor certificates (Figure 30). When questioned about all the various
types of training received covering angle of attack instrumentation, 97 participants
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Figure 30. Safety Survey Respondents by Highest Level Pilot Certificate
responded. Over one quarter of the pilots responding reported having received no
training regarding AOA instrumentation on their aircraft (26 or 26.8%). Of the
remaining 71 responding pilots (73.2%), 51 (52.58%) reported learning about AOA
instrumentation from self-study or discussion with other pilots, 24 (24.74%) had received
ground training about AOA instrumentation from a flight instructor, and 18 (18.56%) had
received flight training with AOA instrumentation from a flight instructor (Figure 31).

Received flight training on AOA
instrumentation from a flight
instructor
Received ground training on AOA
instrumentation from a flight
instructor
Learned about AOA
instrumentation through self-study
or discussion with other pilots
Received no training on AOA
instrumentation
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40

50
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Figure 31. All Types of Training Received on AOA Instrumentation
Respondents were informed that three University of North Dakota Cessna 172s
had been modified with AOA instrumentation during the last year. They were asked if
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they had flown any of these aircraft. Of 98 pilots responding, 59 (60.2%) said they had
flown modified aircraft, 30 (30.61%) had not, and nine (9.18%) did not remember or did
not know if they had flown modified aircraft (Figure 32).
Yes

No

Don't
remember/don't
know

Figure 32. Responding pilots having flown AOA modified aircraft
When asked to describe their experience flying AOA modified aircraft, 98 pilots
responded. Forty (40.82%) reported having not flown or did not remember flying a
modified aircraft. Interestingly, this is one more than reported not flying or not
remembering flying modified aircraft in the preceding question. Of the remaining 58
pilots, 41 (41.84%) reported flying a modified aircraft, but claimed to have ignored the
AOA instrumentation; 11 (11.22%) reported flying a modified aircraft and using the
AOA instrumentation for supplemental information during approach and landing; 6
(6.12%) reported flying a modified aircraft and using the AOA instrumentation
throughout the flight; none claimed to have flown modified aircraft many times and used
AOA instrumentation extensively (Figure 33).
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Figure 33. Experience flying AOA modified aircraft
Based on their training and experience, pilots were asked to choose applicable
statements indicating or comment about practical uses of AOA instrumentation. Of 88
responding, 47 (53.41%) chose “avoiding departure stalls,” 41 (46.59%) chose “avoiding
stalls in the traffic pattern,” 29 (32.96%) chose “avoiding stalls while maneuvering
inflight,” 12 (13.64%) chose “determining best range or best endurance conditions
inflight,” and 20 (22.73%) don’t believe there are any practical uses of AOA
instrumentation on light aircraft (Figure 34). Additional comments were received from
14 (15.91%) of respondents. Two themes were evident in these comments. First, lack of
training caused some pilots to choose not to use installed AOA instrumentation or not to
comment about practical uses of a system with which they were not familiar. “Due to the
lack of information about how to use them, I do not know how, so I don't use them,” and
“I'm not educated on it enough to make an informed decision.” The second theme was an
expressed concern about over-reliance on instrumentation at the expense of the implied
higher importance of learning to fly by feel. “Pilots should learn to fly by feel in this
stage of training,” or “It is too early for this ‘cheap’ technology. Manufacturers are
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calculating AOA differently.” Other comments referred to seeing AOA vs. airspeed
relationships and suggested different instrument displays from those installed. At the
opposite end of the learn to fly by feel argument was this statement: “Inexperienced pilots
could benefit from these instruments in avoiding stall conditions, however, I do not
believe they add much for an experienced pilot who flies regularly.”
Other
Not practical on light aircraft
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Avoiding stalls in the traffic…
Avoiding departure stalls
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Figure 34. Practical Uses of AOA Instrumentation
Respondents were asked if, in their opinion, general aviation pilots were more
likely to fly a stabilized turn from base leg to final and a stabilized final approach in
aircraft equipped with supplemental AOA instrumentation than in aircraft not so
equipped. Of the 97 responses received, 33 (34.02%) said yes, 41 (42.27%) said no, and
23 (23.71%) had no opinion or preferred not to answer (Figure 35).

Yes
No
No opinion

Figure 35. Respondents believing supplemental AOA systems contribute to more
stabilized final turns and final approaches
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When asked if general aviation pilots encountering an unstable approach were
more likely to execute a go-around in aircraft equipped with supplemental AOA
instrumentation than those without, 30 (30.93%) of the 97 pilots who responded said yes.
Just over half (49 or 50.52%) said no, and 18 (18.56%) had no opinion or preferred not to
answer (Figure 36).

Yes
No
No opinion

Figure 36. Respondents believing pilots encountering unstable approaches were more
likely to execute a go-around when equipped with supplemental AOA instrumentation
When asked about the most positive aspects of having supplemental AOA
systems installed on general aviation aircraft, 60 pilots responded. The dominant theme
in these comments was increased situational awareness with regard to proximity to the
stall angle of attack. One flight instructor said, “It’s another tool to enhance situational
awareness for a pilot. It’s one more way for a pilot to help fly a stabilized approach.” A
commercial pilot called AOA systems a “good back up for having to look down at
airspeed, increases situational awareness.” A private pilot who had received ground and
flight instruction with the instruments called AOA systems “an accurate look into the
aircraft performance, as opposed to using hearing and buffeting to determine how close
the aircraft is to a stall.” Lack of training in supplemental AOA systems was highlighted
by another flight instructor. “I believe angle of attack instruments could help reduce the
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amount of stall/spin accidents that occur inadvertently in general aviation. However, for
this to occur the pilot needs to have proper training on the AOA system.”
Responses regarding the most negative aspects of having supplemental AOA
systems installed on general aviation aircraft numbered 63. The overwhelming majority
of comments addressed pilot distraction or potential over-reliance on instrumentation.
Lack of training was mentioned in many cases and was evident from a misunderstanding
of the systems displayed in some comments. One flight instructor said, “I find them to be
a distraction. It’s one more thing inside the plane that pilots have to keep them from
looking outside. When I flew with the AOA indicators I found myself several times just
looking at it instead of outside at my aim point.” One student who reported receiving
ground and flight instruction from an instructor explained, “I feel like it’s really not
needed because people do without it all the time, it’s just another thing to look at and
check to make sure it is not in a high angle of attack. The point of the flight instruments
is to look at them and fly according to them, there is no need for another instrument.”
Another flight instructor noted, “Turning base to final is not the time to be spending too
much time with your head in the cockpit. Also no good if pilots are not trained on the
proper use of the system.” An instructor who has not flown with AOA-modified aircraft
said, “…adding yet another thing for beginning pilots to keep track of for their training.
Because UND uses primarily G1000 equipped aircraft, it’s already difficult to keep some
students focused outside the aircraft, which is essential for training…” A student pilot
whose training was limited to self-study or discussion with other pilots was concerned
AOA instrumentation “could take some of the pilot’s attention away from actually flying
the aircraft or looking outside during critical phases of flight,” but added, “If they are
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trained on how to use it though I believe it would be a positive addition to the aircraft.”
Finally, a commercial pilot with no training on AOA instrumentation said, “I’ve heard
they are not helpful and too delayed to make any decisions off them. I don’t know if this
is true.”
The safety survey’s final question asked for specific recommendations to improve
training regarding supplemental AOA systems on general aviation aircraft and received
57 responses. Like the previous questions, respondents were quite divided in their
opinions with answers covering the spectrum from “Get rid of them!” to “Equip the entire
fleet!” Most answers, however, addressed the lack of formal training on supplemental
AOA systems provided in the school environment up to now. One private pilot summed
up the need for training.
Start teaching about them in ground schools. I’ve flown all three and at no point
has anyone told me how to use it. I personally think it’s just one more gadget
UND can put in their aircraft and it’s unnecessary. CFI, CFII, and MEIs should
stress the importance of stalls in the traffic pattern, and this includes where it’s
most likely to occur, also the correct place. They should also be stressing turn
coordination more. I’ve flown on observation flights where the student didn’t
make a single coordinated turn and nothing was said or corrected by the
instructor. Safety deferred is safety denied, plain and simple.
Another private pilot added, “teaching about it in ground school, and explaining how it
works and why it can beneficial, students and instructors would utilize it much more
often and it could be a great and efficient tool to increase situational awareness.”
Frustration was not limited to non-instructors. One CFI explained,
I have never received training on the AOA indicator. I have read some manuals,
but don’t really know when to use it. Since we are doing training, we often have
high AOA intentionally, so I just ignore the AOA indicator. If I receive proper
training on how to use it, my opinion might change but for now I just don’t know
when to use it.
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Another CFI provided system-specific critiques and recommendations, while also
concluding with a misunderstanding of the differences between airspeed and angle of
attack and their relationship to stall.
Of the three that we have I feel as if two of them are fairly useless and one is
excellent. The high-mid-low ones are not useful in my opinion but the one
that shows varying segments as you approach critical angle of attack is actually
really good. When we practice stalls in the airplane, during slow flight, that one
just had a series of slow paced quiet beeps, and as we got to a buffet the AOA
sensor was beeping louder and more rapidly as well as indicating a red downward
arrow. I feel as if that could be a benefit to someone who is less experienced and
might influence them to reduce AOA more urgently than a traditional stall horn.
That to me is what a good angle of attack indicator should do as an enhancement
to a stall horn. The other thing useful that it does is that on landing if a student or
pilot were to flare high and airspeed is reduced significantly, they might be
unaware of how close they are to stall, but the rapid beeping and downward
pointed arrow just a degree or two away from critical AOA might influence a
go-around, a positive outcome. Personally I have seen a student flare high in that
airplane and with the AOA indicator beeping at its most urgent state, sure enough
we dropped right onto the runway and it was a poor landing. I do not believe we
should teach how to land at a specific AOA-an airspeed already achieves that.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Over the course of 1,616 analyzed approaches flown between October 1, 2013
and December 31, 2014, the addition of supplemental angle of attack systems alone did
not significantly increase the likelihood of University of North Dakota pilots flying a
stabilized approach. The overall regression models for speed and height differential were
significant, and although these are the two aspects of stabilized approaches where an
effect due to AOA system installation would be most expected, no significant effect was
observed. Likewise, checking each individual AOA system for influence on approach
performance against the control group of unmodified aircraft yielded no significant
regression models. In the case of height differential, the BendixKing KLR 10 AOA
system by itself contributed significantly to the model with a very small correlation
coefficient, but the overall regression model was not significant. As a result, none of the
individual systems was considered to have predicted speed differential, height
differential, or cross track error.
With regard to the presence of vertical guidance from an approach lighting system
or radio signal from an instrument landing system, no significant effect was observed on
speed differential or cross track error. However, perhaps as expected due to the increased
amount of glide path information available to the pilot, presence of a vertical guidance
system significantly lowered height differential, contributing to a more stable approach.
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Day approaches significantly increased speed differential. Further research might
be warranted in this area, but possible reasons for this relationship might include
increased visual cues available in the daytime competing with instrument crosscheck and
more attention paid to instruments for orientation at night. Daytime also generally results
in more air traffic, so an increased speed differential might also be associated with speed
adjustments accommodating that traffic. Time of day had no significant effect on height
differential. While day approaches significantly reduced cross track error in the
regression model, the overall model was not significant.
Outside air temperature did not significantly affect speed differential or cross
track error. Interestingly, a higher outside air temperature was associated with a higher
height differential. Summer conditions sometimes result in higher levels of convective
turbulence than experienced during the winter, which might have an adverse effect on the
pilot’s ability to maintain a stable glide path. More research is warranted regarding
seasonal effects on stabilized approaches.
Presence of an operating air traffic control tower resulted in significantly lower
speed differential and height differential. ATC presence had no significant effect on
cross track error. Possible reasons for these effects include busier and more regimented
traffic patterns associated with tower controlled airports requiring pilots to focus more
heavily on precise speed and glide path control to remain de-conflicted with other
airplanes.
Runway characteristics of length and width are highly positively correlated for
what might seem to be obvious reasons. Runways built for larger aircraft requiring
longer takeoff or landing rolls also require wider surfaces to safely handle an increased
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aircraft footprint. Increased runway length significantly resulted in higher speed
differential but lower height differential. Runway length had no significant effect on
cross track error. Both significant effects might be associated with small aircraft
operations on larger runways. Smaller aircraft might tend to land longer on larger
runways since landing distance is not as critical. Similarly, most instrument approaches
are made to longer runways. Small aircraft tend to fly higher than final approach
airspeeds during the instrument approach and slow to normal speeds when approaching
the touchdown zone of the runway. Instrument approaches are also designed for a
touchdown point farther from the approach end than might be used for a visual approach
to a short runway. Pilots flying visual approaches or simulating short field approaches on
long runways might aim short of the desired touchdown point, resulting in a lower height
differential.
Given many years of favorable performance on military aircraft and the FAA’s
emphasis on making supplemental AOA systems more available to general aviation
aircraft, an expectation was established that a positive relationship between installed
AOA systems and improved elements of a stabilized approach would exist. A number of
data collection limitations and a current lack of formalized training in AOA
instrumentation may have contributed to finding no significant effects.
Historically, light general aviation aircraft have not been designed or equipped to
collect flight data. As a result, few of these aircraft have any capability to record relevant
flight parameters useful for safety research. Recently, some aircraft owners and flying
schools have begun to install recording equipment on their airplanes to provide data
useful for conducting safety analysis or providing playback of flight training. The
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University of North Dakota’s flight data monitoring system used in this study is able to
capture many flight parameters from the Garmin G1000 avionics, but despite being much
more capable than the majority of general aviation aircraft in this area, several real
limitations still exist with regard to analyzing a dynamic approach environment.
Recording equipment is limited to a 1Hz update rate, meaning that the raw data is
limited to “snapshots” of flight parameters once per second. While university staff have
developed analysis tools for converting snapshot data to “pictures” of dynamic
approaches, these pictures are still limited by data only being input to the model once
each second. Also, the recording equipment is unable to measure some key parameters
associated with landing approaches. Aircraft are not equipped with a radar altimeter, so
altitude above the terrain must be calculated based on a combination of GPS position, the
assumption of a correct altimeter setting, and computation of pressure altitude. Even
with a correctly set pressure altimeter, allowable instrument error is +/- 75 feet.
The aircraft in question have fixed landing gear, so no weight on wheels sensors
are available to tell the flight recorder when the airplane is on the ground. Likewise, flap
position is not recorded, so even an educated guess about what the airplane is doing on or
close to the ground is made more difficult.
Another data measurement limitation springs from the fact that all three of the
installed AOA systems are hard-wired to the aircraft’s electrical power system.
Theoretically, if power is applied to the airplane, the instrument is operating. There is no
way to tell from recordings if installed indicators were operating, were calibrated
correctly, or had been muted or turned off by the pilots. Since all data was collected in a
naturalistic environment where neither pilots nor maintenance personnel knew the AOA
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instrumentation was being observed, there may be an unknown number of cases where
the instrument was not powered or calibrated for proper use inflight.
Since the sample size for this study was quite large, the lack of significant effects
due to AOA systems was not likely due to power limitations. Also, the pilot population
was quite homogeneous in terms of approximate age (all participants in a university flight
training program) and the flying environment in which they operate. At the same time,
demographic information was necessarily limited due to privacy concerns and the true
nature of pilot experience may not be evident. Training experience, social interaction,
and resulting feelings about the addition of supplemental AOA instrumentation might
tend to be more homogeneous with this sample than with the overall general aviation
population.
Collecting data in a naturalistic environment where the pilots were unaware they
were being observed is useful to limit the Hawthorne effect (tendency of individuals to
adjust their behavior based on their awareness of being observed), but it also limits the
researcher’s ability to collect detailed debrief information which could have provided
more details about the approaches flown and analyzed. For example, post-flight
questionnaires or interviews might have yielded more information about instrument
operation, details of maneuvers flown, and pilot inputs regarding specific use or non-use
of AOA instrumentation on that specific flight.
Perhaps the largest limitation on this study was a distinct lack of formal training
on angle of attack concepts and AOA instrumentation among the pilot sample surveyed.
Pilots surveyed responded less than 90 days from the end of the flight data collection
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period, so the assumption is made that many respondents to the safety survey were also
pilots who flew during the flight data collection phase.
Of the 98 pilot participants in the safety survey, none responded that he or she had
“extensive experience” flying with AOA instrumentation, yet many expressed strong
opinions both pro and con. Over 82 percent of survey respondents reported either not
having flown an AOA-modified aircraft or having ignored the instrument when they flew
a modified aircraft. Only 17 pilots responding reported using the AOA instrumentation
for supplemental information during approach and landing or throughout their flights. If
what the pilots say about how they flew closely resembles how they actually did fly, this
may be a major explanation for the lack of effect observed for AOA-modified aircraft on
stabilized approaches. The instrumentation has gone largely unused.
This situation was reported to be largely due to a lack of formal training. When
the three different AOA systems were installed in university aircraft, a conscious decision
was made to install the instruments before formal training was offered. The reasoning
reported was that these instruments were so intuitive that formal training would not be
required. What was perhaps not anticipated was that pilots, particularly low time pilots,
are often taught to develop habit patterns to keep them safe. Comments received in the
safety survey often presented the theme of “I didn’t need it yesterday. Why do I need it
today?” Others adopted an attitude often taught in other safety programs of not operating
a system for which they had not received training.
The level of training in AOA instrumentation was self-reported in the safety
survey. Over one quarter of the respondents (26.8 percent) reported having received no
training at all regarding AOA instrumentation on their aircraft. Just over half (52.6
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percent) reported learning what they knew about AOA instrumentation from “self-study
or discussion with other pilots,” and the remaining quarter reported receiving some kind
of ground and/or flight instruction on the systems from a flight instructor. “Self-study or
discussion with other pilots” allows for a wide spectrum of interpretation, but pilots
operating in a homogeneous training environment likely tend to discuss the topic with
their classmates, and may tend toward similar opinions, whether or not they are based on
technically correct information. In this study, those not in favor of using supplemental
AOA systems on general aviation aircraft number approximately half the respondents and
those in favor of using them or not wanting to express an opinion constitute the other
half, yet three out of four had not received training beyond what they reported as selfstudy or discussion.
The low level of training, and resultant ignoring of the instrumentation, might be
masking useful information about installed AOA systems which might not become
evident until a trained pilot population is sampled. For example, at least one survey
respondent had a definite opinion about which AOA system works best, but any potential
effect it may have had on performance was lost among the high number of approaches
flown where AOA equipment was ignored.
Investigating whether general aviation pilots who fly AOA-equipped aircraft are
more likely to execute a go-around if they encounter an unstable approach than those
flying aircraft not so equipped became nearly impossible due to a combination of data
measurement technical limitations and lack of training among the survey respondents.
The previously mentioned 1Hz update rate, lack of a radar altimeter, no weight-onwheels sensor, and lack of information about flap position effectively mask detection of
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low altitude go-arounds. Review of available data indicated a lack of reliability in
differentiating late go-arounds from touch and go or full stop landings. Of 1,616
approaches analyzed, 310 or 19.2 percent, were labeled unstable by study criteria. By
training policy, these approaches should have resulted in a go-around, but the actual
number executed was not identifiable by the flight data.
Even in cases where a go-around appears to have occurred at a higher altitude (as
illustrated by the 28 outlier cases eliminated from the approach analysis), no reliable
method exists to differentiate among an intentional low approach, an ATC-directed goaround, or a go-around due to an unstable approach.
Survey responses do no better at predicting go-arounds due to unstable
approaches. Respondents expressed their belief that pilots encountering unstable
approaches were more likely to execute a go-around when equipped with supplemental
AOA instrumentation at about the same rates they thought the systems were useful in
general. With 97 pilots responding, 30.9 percent believe pilots would be more likely to
execute a go-around from an unstable approach if equipped with AOA instrumentation.
Just over half (50.5 percent) believed they would not, and the remaining 18.6 percent
offered no opinion.
Only 57 pilots responded to questions about specific recommendations to improve
training regarding supplemental AOA systems, and like the other responses to the safety
survey, represented a wide variety of opinions. Even in responses not specifically
recommending topics for training, misconceptions regarding airspeed versus AOA
relationships were voiced, and indicated the need for better training in aerodynamic
concepts. Many respondents agreed that AOA concepts and systems should be taught in
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ground school in the same way other aircraft systems are taught. From there, flight
training incorporating the concepts taught in ground school could be practiced. Some
instructors expressed frustration with not knowing exactly how and when to use the
instrumentation based on reading basic manuals provided by the manufacturers, and
wanted more detailed information from knowledgeable sources.
Ultimately this study was about incorporating supplemental instrument displays
into effective pilot decision making, but to accurately assess effect, the pilots must be
trained to use the equipment and task being studied. To observe real differences between
AOA-aided approaches and non-AOA approaches, future studies should examine groups
of pilots who have and have not received formal training in AOA system use. While the
Hawthorne effect may have a greater risk of being present, study participants should be
volunteers willing to have their performance measured as well as willing to participate in
more detailed debriefings of their flights. Supplemental AOA systems are worthy of
more future study once adequate formal training has been provided, but until then, their
demonstrated effectiveness must be considered inconclusive.
Recommendations for Further Study
Future research regarding supplemental AOA systems on light general aviation
aircraft should focus on overcoming the three most restrictive limitations observed during
this study: inclusion of formal training for subject pilots, developing a reliable ability to
analyze approaches resulting in a go-around, and collection of pilot feedback
immediately following flights using supplemental AOA systems. Research strengthened
in each of these areas will provide more information needed to determine if supplemental
AOA systems can truly potentially prevent loss of control accidents.
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Formal training should be conducted in both ground and flight training settings
prior to conducting future performance testing. This training should include aerodynamic
theory related to angle of attack as well as how the specific instrument of interest
operates. Subjects to fly data collection flights should be identified to participate as
either trained pilots using supplemental AOA systems or non-trained pilots flying without
AOA instrumentation. Pilots receiving training should also have the opportunity to train
in flight with the AOA instrumentation before flying approaches for record.
Comparisons can then be made between AOA-equipped flights and non-AOA-equipped
flights.
Future research must address the issue of reliably identifying go-arounds at the
conclusion of subject approaches. Several methods are available to address this problem.
First, researchers can develop an additional analysis tool which could model various
landing and go-around situations from the flight parameters collected. Second, with
sufficient support made available, improved flight recording equipment could be used to
more accurately represent the dynamic environment experienced during the approaches
flown. Finally, should resources not be available to procure needed technological
improvements, pilot observations could be manually recorded to overcome much of the
uncertainty experienced in the naturalistic setting of this study. Observer pilots could be
equipped with an event log to be carried on each subject flight, where relevant
information regarding AOA system use and each approach could be recorded in writing.
Post-flight questionnaires and interviews should be used to determine types of
approaches flown, flap settings, how the approach terminated, pilots’ comments about
relevant events, and other feedback needed by the researcher. This type of qualitative
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data collection focuses on detailed event feedback based on training and actual
performance rather than comment by random participants. Data collected in this manner
might overcome some of the potential biases observed during this study which might
have developed in members of a homogeneous pilot group before receiving formal
training.
Including these improvements in future research procedures establishes more of
an operational test environment than the naturalistic setting of the present study. While
potential for the Hawthorne effect must be considered in this scenario, far greater
potential to collect useful data more reliably identifying performance effects due to
supplemental AOA systems should exist.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A
List of Terms
AGL - feet above ground level
Angle of attack – the angle measured in degrees between the wing’s chord line and the
relative wind or freestream velocity vector
Base – a short descending flight path at right angles to the approach end extended
centerline of the landing runway
Chord line - a line drawn between the wing’s leading edge and its trailing edge
Critical Angle of Attack - that angle of attack at which the wing’s maximum lift is
achieved, beyond which there is a significant loss of lift and increase in drag,
where the wing “stalls”
Drag – the force that acts parallel to the relative wind
Electronic Flight Information System (EFIS) – an airplane instrument display system
in which the display is electronic rather than electromechanical
Final – the last leg in an aircraft’s approach to the landing runway, where the aircraft is
aligned with the runway and descending for landing
G loading (also load factor) – the dimensionless ratio of an aircraft’s lift to its weight
expressed in terms of the apparent acceleration of gravity experienced by an
observer on board the aircraft
Go-around (also rejected landing) -- abandoning a landing attempt from
final approach
ILS – Instrument Landing System – a ground based instrument approach system
designed to provide precision lateral and vertical guidance to an appropriately
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equipped aircraft using a combination of radio signals, to allow a precision
approach during instrument conditions. The lateral guidance is provided by
a localizer signal, and the vertical guidance is provided by a glide slope signal.
KIAS - Knots Indicated Airspeed
Light-emitting Diode (LED) – a semiconductor which emits light when electrical current
passes through it
Lift – the force acting perpendicular to the relative wind
NACA 2412 airfoil – airfoil shape categorized by the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics commonly used in light general aviation airplane design
PAPI – Precision Approach Path Indicator – a lighting system serving as a visual aid
to pilots acquiring and maintaining a proper glide path to the landing runway.
It is installed on either side of the runway approximately 1,000 feet from
the approach end and displays combinations of red and white lights to indicate an
airplane’s height in relation to the desired glide path.

Figure 37. PAPI indicating on glide path
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Pitot/static system – a system of pressure-sensitive instruments designed to determine
airspeed, altitude, and altitude trend
Relative wind - the direction at which a vehicle in flight meets the oncoming airstream
Secure Digital (SD) card – small flash memory card used to store large amounts of data
on a small device
Sideslip angle – rotation of the aircraft centerline from the relative wind, generally
referred to as positive when the relative wind approaches from right of the
nose and negative when the relative wind approaches from left of the nose
Stall – a condition where the wing drastically loses lift at an angle of attack greater than
the critical angle of attack
Spin – a stall resulting in autorotation about the vertical axis and descending in a shallow,
rotating path
Stall warning tab – a component of some light aircraft stall warning systems where a thin,
moveable, metal tab is mounted in an opening in the leading edge of a wing. The
tab is moved by air from the relative wind striking it. As airflow approaches the
critical angle of attack, the tab strikes a plate which activates a stall warning horn
audible to the pilot.
VASI – Vertical Approach Slope Indicator – a lighting system serving as a visual aid
to pilots acquiring and maintaining a proper glide path to the landing runway.
Light bars are installed at different distances from the approach end on the side of
the landing runway, so red or white lights are displayed depending on the
airplane’s glide path angle. If on the desired glide path, the far bar will display
red while the near bar displays white. This is commonly referred to as “red over
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white.” VASI has been replaced by the newer PAPI at many airports.

Figure 38. VASI indicating on glide path
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Appendix B
Online Flying Safety Survey
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Appendix C
Airports and Runways Used for Approach Analysis

Grand Forks International Airport, Grand Forks, ND

Crookston Municipal Kirkwood Field, Crookston, MN
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Hutson Field, Grafton, ND

Warren Municipal Airport, Warren, MN
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